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ABSTRACT
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 compels an
insider to disgorge short-swing profits earned from a paired purchase
and sale of the issuer’s securities executed within six months. On
one hand, Section 16(b)’s introductory purpose clause seems to limit
the statute’s application to instances where there might be a risk of
speculative abuse. On the other hand, Section 16(b) imposes a strict
liability-like standard that triggers disgorgement once the statute’s
objectively applied criteria are met.
The circuit courts, in
interpreting Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,
the seminal Supreme Court decision on the matter, are divided over
whether to adopt an objective or subjective approach and, as such,
how and when to apply the Supreme Court’s unorthodox transaction
exemption from 16(b) liability. This Note analyzes the split and
offers a critique of the Second Circuit’s pragmatic interpretation of
Kern County’s ruling.
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INTRODUCTION
Under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(“Exchange Act”),1 short-swing profits earned by a corporate insider
from the paired sale and purchase, or purchase and sale, of the issuer’s
security within a six month period may be disgorged and recovered by
the issuer.2 Section 16(b), passed at the dawn of the New Deal era as a
restriction on insider trading, has never been a provision that provided
fertile grounds for litigation since its impact always lay more in its
deterrent, or prophylactic, effect than in its prosecutorial ambitions.3
1.
2.
3.

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006).
Id.
The mechanical, bright line rule for administration of Section 16(b) facilitates
the establishment of a strong deterrent effect, while avoiding a taxing amount of
litigation. See Karl Shumpei Okamoto, Rereading Section 16(b) of the Securities
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Operating very much under the radar, and under the shadows of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5’s own insider trading restriction,4 Section 16(b)
has endured the test of time all the same.5
Still, in recent years, its efficacy has been challenged, or at least,
complicated by a constantly evolving class of “‘unorthodox’
transactions”6 and an increasingly complex array of financial
instruments, which have threatened to elude classification as Section
16(b) purchases and sales.7 In the face of these challenges, Section
16(b)’s introductory purpose clause, which self-identifies the statute’s
underlying rationale, has proven to be both a stabilizing force that has
guided courts’ application of Section 16(b) and a destabilizing force that
has compelled courts to engage in the type of ad hoc, case-specific
analysis that defies simple administration of the law.8 The same
adaptations that have ensured Section 16(b)’s durability have
accelerated its demise as a prophylactic measure.9
This Note focuses primarily on the types of transactions that are
subject to Section 16(b) disgorgement and, in particular, how the
purpose clause dictates the choices that courts and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) have made regarding the Section 16(b)
eligibility of unorthodox transactions and derivative securities. Since
the terms “purchase” and “sale” are meant to be construed in a way that
advances the statutory purpose, courts typically subject a transaction to
the restrictions of Section 16(b) only if treating the transaction as a
“purchase” or “sale” is supportable under the statute and if the
transaction could give rise to speculative abuse.10
Exchange Act, 27 GA. L. REV. 183, 192 (1992) (citing Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425
F.2d 348, 351(2d Cir. 1970)).
4. Id. at 184.
5. Id. at 183–84.
6. This term was coined by Professor Louis Loss, who used it in reference to a
group of transactions including “stock conversions, exchanges pursuant to mergers and
other corporate reorganizations, stock reclassifications, and dealings in options, rights
and warrants.” 2 LOUIS LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 1069 (2d ed. 1961), quoted in
Kern Cnty. Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 593 n.24 (1973).
7. See Peter J. Romeo & Alan L. Dye, Developments Under Section 16, in ALIABA COURSE OF STUDY: FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES LAW 598 (2011).
8. See infra Parts II and III.
9. See infra Parts III and IV.
10. Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 1970) (“[C]ourts have
generally concluded that a transaction falls within the ambit of Section 16(b) if it can be
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Part I of this Note first presents an overview of Section 16(b) of the
Exchange Act, including its statutory elements and basic judicial
overlay. This Part then examines the statute’s preamble, or introductory
clause, which explicitly identifies the statute’s goal. After considering
the standard, Supreme Court-approved understanding of the statutory
purpose, this Part presents two scholars’ innovative readings of Section
16(b)’s purpose. Challenging the presumption that Section 16(b) was
exclusively designed to protect investors from insider trading, these
scholars attribute more nuanced and particular motivations to the
lawmakers who drafted the Exchange Act.
Part II assesses the early judicial shift, popularized by the Supreme
Court’s decision in Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp.,11 away from a harsh and objective application of Section 16(b)
toward a more relaxed, pragmatic, and statutory purpose-driven
application. This Part analyzes how, instead of automatically branding
all transactions that meet Section 16(b)’s technical criteria as Section
16(b) restricted purchases or sales, courts have developed a
methodology of case-by-case analysis, under which a matching purchase
and sale can only trigger disgorgement in cases that allow for the
possibility of speculative abuse. In particular, Part II explores the
Supreme Court-sanctioned unorthodox transaction exception and the
varying interpretations of it offered by the circuit courts. It presents a
split between the Second Circuit, which interprets the Supreme Court
ruling in light of its statutory purpose-driven, subjective approach to
Section 16(b), and the Ninth and Fifth Circuits, which read the Supreme
Court ruling through the lens of their objective approach to Section
16(b). Finally, Part II demonstrates how the subjective approach shaped
the SEC’s decision to classify derivative security transactions as Section
16(b) purchases and sales.
Part III takes a critical look at the Second Circuit’s statutory
purpose-driven reading of the Supreme Court’s unorthodox transaction
exception. After offering a more nuanced and complex rendering of the
Second Circuit position, this Part highlights some of the failures of the
Second Circuit view. Ultimately, this analysis leads to the conclusion
that the Second Circuit approach necessitates an ad hoc, case-specific
reasonably characterized as a ‘purchase’ or ‘sale’ without doing violence to the
language of the statute, and if the transaction is of a kind which can possibly lend itself
to the speculation encompassed by Section 16(b).”).
11. 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
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approach that does not properly serve the prophylactic interests of
Section 16(b).
I. OVERVIEW OF SECTION 16(b)
Part I of this Note first introduces the statutory elements that form
the basis of a Section 16(b) claim for disgorgement. Next, it highlights
the strict liability-like regime created by the mechanical operation of
those elements. Then, it presents a discussion of the underlying
rationale behind the statute, as articulated in the statute’s introductory
clause and interpreted by the courts and by modern day scholars. Part I
then addresses the early judicial attempts to reconcile the objective
terms of Section 16(b) application with the statutory purpose and
illustrates how those early decisions culminated in the seminal Supreme
Court decision on the matter. Finally, this Part concludes by examining
the confounding factors in Kern County that contributed to a circuit split
revolving around the scope of Kern County’s unorthodox transaction
exemption.
A. SECTION 16(b) STATUTORY ELEMENTS
To establish a Section 16(b) claim for disgorgement, the plaintiff—
either the security issuer or one of its shareholders who files suit
derivatively12—must prove that the defendant—a corporate insider or
over-10% shareholder—realized profit from a paired purchase and sale
of the issuer’s securities within a six month period.13 The terms “sale”
12. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006) (“Suit
to recover [short-swing] profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of
competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the
name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within
sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; but no
such suit shall be brought more than two years after the date such profit was realized.”).
13. See Gwozdzinsky v. Zell/Chilmark Fund, L.P., 156 F.3d 305, 308 (2d Cir.
1998). The statute states, in relevant part:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to
the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and
purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) . . .
shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part
of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of
holding the security or security-based swap agreement purchased or of not
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and “purchase” are not explicitly defined in Section 16(b) itself, but
have been broadly defined elsewhere in the Exchange Act.14 Under the
Act, “[t]he terms ‘buy’ and ‘purchase’ include any contract to buy,
purchase, or otherwise acquire,” while “[t]he terms ‘sale’ and ‘sell’
include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of.”15 These
definitions, as applied to Section 16(b), expose a wide range of
transactions to liability.16 In fact, a purchase or sale does not need to be
scrutinized under the standard trappings of contract law or commercial
law to meet Section 16(b) requirements.17 Nevertheless, the emergence
of so-called “unorthodox transactions” and the rapid growth of the
derivative securities market challenged the courts and the SEC to further
widen the net of transactions that could be classified as Section 16(b)
purchases and sales so as to effectuate the statutory purpose of Section
16(b).18
B. SECTION 16(b)’S MECHANICAL OPERATION
Section 16(b) establishes bright line rules under which an insider’s
in and out sequence of trades within a six month period creates a
presumption of abuse.19 That is to say that “paired” transactions trigger
Section 16(b) liability whether or not the insider intended for them to
offset one another as a means of securing speculative profit.20

repurchasing the security or security-based swap agreement sold for a period
exceeding six months.
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).
14. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(13)–(14), 15 U.S.C. §

78(c)(a)(13)–(14) (2006).
15. Id.
16. Arnold S. Jacobs, An Analysis of Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 32 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 209, 391 (1987).
17. Id. (citing, e.g., Portnoy v. Revlon, Inc., 650 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir. 1981)).
See also Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 1970).
18. See infra Part II.
19. Okamoto, supra note 3, at 193 (quoting Kern Cnty. Land Co. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 611 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
20. Section 16(b) allows for the disgorgement of insider profits “irrespective of any
intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such
transaction of holding the security or security-based swap agreement purchased or of
not repurchasing the security or security-based swap agreement sold for a period
exceeding six months.” Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(2006). An insider can earn a “speculative profit” by “investing in the securities of his
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Legislators intentionally crafted Section 16(b) to operate in this
mechanical way so as to facilitate practical administration of the rule.
Thomas G. Corcoran, advisor to President Franklin D. Roosevelt and
one of the drafters of Section 16, famously testified at the legislative
hearing on the Exchange Act that:
[Y]ou hold the director, irrespective of any intention or expectation
to sell the security within 6 months after, because it will be
absolutely impossible to prove the existence of such intention or
expectation, and you have to have this crude rule of thumb, because
you cannot undertake the burden of having to prove that the director
21
intended, at the time he bought, to get out on a short swing.

As a by-product of this strict liability-like regime,22 which links any
two counter-transactions of the insider’s company stock, realized profits
for Section 16(b) purposes are computed as the difference between the
highest sale price and lowest purchase price for which an identical
number of the insider’s shares were transacted within a six month
period.23 Section 16(b)’s objective standard is also a determining factor
in establishing the potential liability of the parties involved. The
statute’s flat rule, which calls for a presumption of abuse, only applies to
corporate insiders and beneficial owners—over-10%-owners of the
company’s stock.24 The extension of the law, beyond the typical
corporate executive or officer to include an over-10%-beneficial owner
as a statutory insider, presumes that such a person exerts enough control

issuer, holding them briefly, and then divesting himself of his investment at a tidy
profit.” Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425 F.2d 348, 355 (2d Cir. 1970).
21. Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices before the S. Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 73d Cong. 6557 (1934) (testimony of Thomas Corcoran).
22. See Gwozdzinsky v. Zell/Chilmark Fund, L.P., 156 F.3d 305, 310 (2d Cir.
1998) (“The statute, as written, establishes strict liability for all transactions that meet
its mechanical requirements.”).
23. See Donoghue v. Natural Microsystems Corp., 198 F. Supp. 2d 487, 492
(S.D.N.Y. 2002). This “lowest purchase price, highest sale price” rule, known as the
‘Lowest-In, Highest-Out’ method, is considered “w[e]ll-established.” Huppe ex rel.
WCPS Int’l Inc. v. Special Situations Fund, 565 F. Supp. 2d 495, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(quoting Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 269 (2d Cir. 1969)). The rule
was first established by the Second Circuit in Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231
(2d Cir. 1943).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).
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over the company to be privy to inside information.25 Even then, the
bright line rule establishes that a beneficial owner can only face Section
16(b) liability if he owned over 10% of the stock at the time of both the
sale and purchase.26 In contrast to corporate insiders and statutory
insiders, Section 16(b) liability can never attach to outside investors,
who become privy to inside information through a tippee.27
C. SECTION 16(b)’S STATUTORY PURPOSE
While it is highly unusual for Congress to articulate a provision’s
underlying rationale in the language of the statute itself, lawmakers
incorporated an introductory clause, or preamble, into the statutory
language of Section 16(b) to do just that. The legislative history of
Section 16(b) suggests any number of possible reasons that lawmakers
may have deemed it necessary in this instance.28 For one, Congress may
have inserted the clause to bolster the constitutionality of Section
16(b),29 which was somewhat questionable given the statute’s broad
grant of rulemaking authority to the SEC30 and Congress’s arguable
overreach of its regulatory authority beyond the realm of interstate

25. See, e.g., American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co., 510 F.2d 1043, 1055 (2d Cir.
1975) (“The 10% holder in the garden variety case is presumed to be ‘influential’ as a
friend of management or in control of some directors.”).
26. Section 16(b) states: “This subsection shall not be construed to cover any
transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase
and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security or security-based swap agreement or a
security-based swap involved, or any transaction or transactions which the Commission
by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this
subsection.” Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b). See also
Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 423 (1972).
27. Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 411–12 (1962).
28. The interpretations offered here are not the product of mere conjecture, but
have been offered by commentators who gleaned them from Section 16(b)’s legislative
history. See Steve Thel, The Genius Of Section 16: Regulating The Management Of
Publicly Held Companies, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 391, 481 (1991).
29. See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 1943) (“The
legislative custom to insert declarations of purpose as an aid to constitutionality is well
known.”).
30. Thel, supra note 28, at 481–82 (citing LOSS, supra note 6, at 547–48). Under
the statute, Section 16(b) “shall not be construed to cover any transaction . . . which the
Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the
purpose of this subsection.” 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).
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commerce.31 At minimum, the statute’s self-declared purpose may have
been seen as a necessary check on the SEC’s statutorily granted power
to exempt securities from Section 16(b)’s clampdown on insider
trading.32 The inclusion of the statutory purpose in the Act would force
the SEC to limit the exercise of its exemptive authority in ways
consistent with the statutory purpose.33
The statute’s introductory clause explains that the disgorgement of
short swing profits is “[f]or the purpose of preventing the unfair use of
information which may have been obtained by [a] beneficial owner,
director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer . . . .”34 The
Supreme Court understood from Section 16(b)’s introductory clause that
the provision was deemed necessary by Congress to attain the Exchange
Act’s stated goal of “insur[ing] the maintenance of fair and honest
markets.”35 It famously observed that “Congress sought to curb the evils
of insider trading [by] . . . taking the profits out of a class of transactions
in which the possibility of abuse was believed to be intolerably great.”36
Moreover, the Court noted that the Section 16(b) restriction was directed
at an issuer’s directors and officers, as well as stockholders with over
10% control, because of the presumption that their positions with the
issuer company afforded them access to insider information.37

31. Thel, supra note 28, at 483–84. According to Thel’s theory, the true agenda
underlying the statute may have been hidden out of concern that political opponents
would object to Congress’s regulation of corporations, seeing it as an unconstitutional
regulation of intrastate commerce. Attributing Section 16(b)’s purpose to insider
trading on the stock market makes it easier to present the law as a regulation of
interstate commerce. Id. at 483–84.
32. Id. at 481.
33. Id.
34. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).
35. Kern Cnty. Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 591 (1973)
(quoting Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006)). One Second
Circuit decision, which had already declared achieving a “fair and honest market” to be
the primary purpose of 16(b), described such a market as one that “reflect[s] an
evaluation of securities in light of all available and pertinent data.” See Smolowe v.
Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 1943).
36. Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232, 243 (1976)
(quoting Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 423 (1972)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
37. Id. at 243–44.
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Henceforth, lower courts and scholars almost unanimously adopted the
Supreme Court’s articulation of the statutory purpose as gospel.38
Still, despite courts’ unanimous view that Section 16(b) was meant
to combat the evils of insider trading, a variation in one important detail
yields two slightly different court formulations of the statutory
purpose.39 Some courts indicate that the statutory purpose of Section
16(b) is to prevent the unjust enrichment of corporate insiders at the
expense of investors who are not privy to the same high-level, privileged
information.40 In other words, the statute protects an insider’s trading
partner from being taken advantage of by an insider who has superior
information by virtue of his or her relationship to the issuer.41
Generally, then, the law protects the public by leveling the playing field
for all investors.
Other courts train Section 16(b)’s focus on protecting outside
stockholders from the speculative abuse of insiders.42 From this
perspective, Section 16(b) not only seeks to correct for the systemic
problem wrought by an information imbalance favoring insiders, but
also to put an end to stock price manipulations that insiders could
orchestrate to artificially raise or lower stock prices and guarantee
38. See ARNOLD S. JACOBS, 5A DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE
SECURITIES LAWS § 4:150 n.3 (2012) (listing cases). The Supreme Court considered it
“well known” that Congress enacted Section 16(b) to curb insider trading. ForemostMcKesson, 423 U.S. at 243 (“The general purpose of Congress in enacting § 16(b) is
well known.” (citing Kern County, 411 U.S. at 591–92; Reliance Elec., 404 U.S. at
422)).
39. Jacobs, supra note 16, at 357–58. As early as 1943, the Second Circuit had
explicitly articulated the twin goals of Section 16(b) in a similar way. See Smolowe, 136
F.2d at 235.
40. See Foremost-McKesson, 423 U.S. at 243.
41. Steel Partners II, L.P. v. Bell Indus., Inc., 315 F.3d 120, 123 (2d Cir. 2002);
Gwozdzinsky v. Zell/Chilmark Fund, L.P., 156 F.3d 305, 308 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Section
16(b) of the Exchange Act seeks to deter ‘insiders,’ who are presumed to possess
material information about the issuer, from using such information as a basis for
purchasing or selling the issuer’s equity securities at an advantage over persons with
whom they trade.”). In fact, in one recent decision, the Second Circuit asserted that
Section 16(b)’s purpose is only advanced by its enforcement in cases where an
asymmetry of information benefits the insider at the expense of the insider’s trading
partner. See Roth v. Perseus, L.L.C., 522 F.3d 242, 249 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that the
SEC did not exceed its statutorily granted power under Section 16(b) by exempting
certain transactions between an insider and the insider’s issuer under Rule 16b-3(d)).
42. Jacobs, supra note 16, at 357–58. See, e.g., American Standard, Inc. v. Crane
Co., 510 F.2d 1043, 1060 (2d Cir. 1975).
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themselves a profit on a short term investment in the stock.43 As such,
Section 16(b) protects not only the potential investor community and,
more specifically, an insider’s unsuspecting trading partner, but it also
protects actual stockholders of the security who are not privy to the
same high level information and could be victimized by an insider’s
manipulation of the stock.44
Despite the explicit and seemingly incontrovertible statutory
language that 16(b) was meant to “prevent the unfair use of
information” by corporate insiders, some scholars point to weaknesses
and inconsistencies that have eroded their faith in and fidelity to the
stated statutory purpose. For one, they observe, Section 16(b) is both
overbroad and under-inclusive if its goal is to deter insider trading.45
Section 16(b)’s strict liability-like enforcement renders the statute
overbroad since it restricts insiders who do not necessarily have any
insider information.46 At the same time, it is too narrowly constructed to
be able to reach all statutory insiders who possess inside information
and trade on that basis.47 In fact, Section 16(b) only allows for the
disgorgement of short swing profits earned by insiders from a sale and
purchase executed within six months of one another.48 It is fair game,
under 16(b), therefore, for insiders to buy and sell on the basis of inside
information as long as their transactions are spaced out over more than
six months.49 Moreover, these scholars observe, if the goal was really to
level the playing field, the narrow construction of Section 16(b) is
misguided since it handicaps enforcement of the statute with regard to
outsiders who obtain insider information.50
In recent years, scholars have advanced alternative theories behind
Section 16(b)’s statutory purpose, including some that either disregard
or blatantly contradict the statute’s self-described purpose.51 Professor
Steve Thel offers perhaps the most novel explanation, plumbing Section
43.
1966)).
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Jacobs, supra note 16, at 358–59 (citing Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir.
See id.
See Okamoto, supra note 3, at 191–92; Thel, supra note 28, at 417.
Okamoto, supra note 3, at 191; Thel, supra note 28, at 417.
Okamoto, supra note 3, at 191–92; Thel, supra note 28, at 417.
Okamoto, supra note 3, at 191; Thel, supra note 28, at 417.
Thel, supra note 28, at 417–18.
Id. at 446; Okamoto, supra note 3, at 209.
See Okamoto, supra note 3; Thel, supra note 28.
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16’s legislative history to uncover what he believes is the hidden agenda
underlying Section 16(b).52 Thel argues that, while restricting insider
trading was certainly a goal of some lawmakers in passing Section
16(b),53 the true goal of Section 16(b) was to regulate corporate
management.54
According to Thel’s theory, lawmakers were more concerned with
ensuring the overall financial well-being of publicly held corporations
than with eliminating the insider trading advantage corporate insiders
might exploit to line their own pockets.55 Congress designed Section
16(b) to facilitate corporations’ long-term growth and sustainability, and
thereby maximize corporate profits and shareholder gains, by aligning
the interests of corporate management with the interests of
stockholders.56
Specifically, Section 16(b)’s drafters hoped that
requiring corporate insiders to hold onto their issuer company’s stock
for the long-term would discourage insiders from manipulating the
market and artificially driving the stock price up or down long enough
for them to manufacture short-swing profits.57
Thel hypothesizes that lawmakers sought to hide Section 16(b)’s
true agenda of effecting a change in corporate structure, under the guise
that 16(b)’s purpose was to curb insider trading.58 In the drafters’
minds, concealment of Section 16(b)’s true purpose may have been a
necessary tactic to ensure broad support from lawmakers for the passage
of Section 16.59 Disclosure of Section 16(b)’s genuine purpose was seen
as likely to expose the provision to political opposition claims that the
government was wrongly imposing its will on corporate America and
that the provision was constitutionally objectionable.60 Attributing
52. Thel offers a critical analysis of the legislative history of Section 16, generally,
and demonstrates that increasing unemployment among the general public was the
primary force behind the New Deal securities laws. Recalibrating the corporate
structure was seen as a means of ultimately improving the plight of consumers and
workers, with not so much of a focus on protecting investors as we tend to think. Id. at
410–11. A thorough treatment of the legislative history is beyond the scope of this
Note.
53. Id. at 453.
54. Id. at 405–06.
55. See id.
56. Id. at 399–400.
57. Id. at 433.
58. Id. at 483.
59. Id.
60. Id.

2013]

SECTION 16(b) EXISTENTIALISM

701

Section 16(b) to insider trading, however, was a much safer option since
insider trading was seen as an exploitative practice that most lawmakers
were presumably eager to eliminate.61
Professor Karl Shumpei Okamoto offers a second, alternative basis
for Section 16(b) founded on modern finance economics.62 The purpose
of Section 16(b), argues Okamoto, is to disincentivize insiders from
transacting in the issuer’s stocks for the sole purpose of manipulating
the market and artificially effecting price changes.63 Under Okamoto’s
theory, the public assumes that corporate insiders trade based on the
inside information at their disposal.64 Because of that perception,
corporate insiders’ decisions about whether to buy or sell company stock
generally trigger temporary price fluctuations in the marketplace, as
investors make the corresponding transactions that they believe will
enable them to capitalize on the corporate news presumably being
broadcast by an insider’s trading patterns.65 But, if an insider
deliberately buys or sells company stock in order to elicit a market
reaction, and not because of any corporate news, the false signal it
produces affords the insider the opportunity to exploit investors’
misreading of the market signal and reap a short-swing profit before the
market has a chance to recover.66 Section 16(b) was meant to counteract
abuse of this market power; corporate insiders who manipulate the
market for personal gain can no longer trade in and out on a short term
basis to reap their ill-gained speculative profits.67
Okamoto, much like Thel, minimizes the importance of Section
16(b)’s introductory clause. According to Okamoto, Section 16(b)’s
introductory clause is merely a “speech” that expresses the concerns of

61. Id. at 483–84.
62. Okamoto, supra note 3, at 183, 198. Professor Okamoto explains that,
according to modern finance theory, “the value of a capital asset, such as stock, is a
function of such asset’s systemic risk and its expected return.” Id. at 198 (citing, e.g.,
RICHARD BREALEY & STEWART MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 161–65
(4th ed. 1991).
63. Okamoto, supra note 3, at 185.
64. Id. at 201.
65. Id. at 204.
66. Id. at 197.
67. Id. at 197–98.
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Section 16(b)’s drafters68 and, most certainly, is not a controlling or
dispositive guide to 16(b)’s application; however, as much as Okamoto
fancies himself to be “[f]reed from [the preamble’s] excessive
ambition,”69 he, as well as Thel, cannot break free from nor deny the
courts’ repeated attributions of the statute to insider trading.70 In fact,
the courts’ renderings of the statutory purpose have played a pivotal role
in shaping the contours of Section 16(b) jurisprudence.71
D. BACKGROUND: EARLY SPLIT AMONG THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS
The relative importance of the statute’s purpose clause and the flat
rule of Section 16(b) almost immediately became the basis of a split
among the lower courts regarding Section 16(b)’s scope.72 As early as
1943, in Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.,73 the Second Circuit downplayed
the interpretive value of Section 16(b)’s preamble74 and opted to abide
by an objective, flat rule application of Section 16(b).75 Early on, this
position, which was also adopted by some other circuit courts, seemed
to have become the mainstream Second Circuit view.76
The contrary view, ultimately adopted by the majority of courts,
found the introductory clause to be an overriding factor that superseded

68. Id. at 208 (“The broad language of the preamble was [nothing but a] a speech, a
loose articulation of what was on the minds of some of those who participated in
adopting the statute.”).
69. Id.
70. See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text.
71. See infra Part II.
72. See Kern Cnty. Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 594
n.26 (1973).
73. 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943).
74. Okamoto, supra note 3, at 207. See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231,
236 (2d Cir. 1943) (“The failure to limit the recovery to profits gained from misuse of
information justifies the conclusion that the preamble was inserted for other purposes
than as a restriction on the scope of the Act.”).
75. See Smolowe, 136 F.2d at 231. See also Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160
F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947) (adopting the objective rule approach and holding that a
conversion of preferred stock into common stock qualified as a statutory “purchase”
that, paired with a subsequent sale, gave rise to 16(b) disgorgement).
76. See, e.g., Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965); Adler v.
Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959); Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984
(2d Cir. 1947). It was a decidedly imbalanced split among the circuit courts, as the
clear majority view adopted the pragmatic approach. Id.
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the mechanical application of Section 16(b).77 In fact, the Second
Circuit itself later repudiated its earlier commitment to the objective rule
and held, for the first time, in Blau v. Lamb,78 that notwithstanding
Section 16(b)’s crude rule of thumb, a court should not apply 16(b)
unless it first ascertained that the transaction at hand gave rise to the
possibility of speculative abuse.79 The Second Circuit’s change of heart
was so complete that it would later note “[t]he judicial tendency,
especially in th[e Second Circuit], . . . to interpret Section 16(b) in ways
that are most consistent with the legislative purpose.”80 Under this
subjective approach, a borderline transaction, which did not clearly fall
within the scope of Section 16(b) purchases and sales, could still qualify
for 16(b) liability if it could give rise to speculative abuse.81
E. SUPREME COURT’S FIDELITY TO SECTION 16(b)’S INTRODUCTORY
CLAUSE
The Supreme Court later weighed in, adopting the subjective,
pragmatic approach to Section 16(b).82 In so doing, it established a
template for how the introductory purpose clause should interact with
the statutory interpretation of Section 16(b) as a whole. Specifically, it
held that any ambiguity in the statute should be resolved in favor of the
explanation that most closely adheres to the statutory purpose of curbing
insiders’ short-swing trading.83 Liability cannot, however, follow under
circumstances that fall short of the criteria specified in Section 16(b), no
matter how much a Section 16(b) disgorgement would fulfill the
statutory purpose.84

77.
78.
79.
80.

Jacobs, supra note 16, at 428.
363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966).
Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 518–19 (2d Cir. 1966).
Portnoy v. Seligman & Latz, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1188, 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(quoting Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 262 (2d Cir. 1969)). See also
DiLorenzo v. Murphy, 443 F.3d 224, 227 (2d Cir. 2006); Steel Partners II, L.P. v. Bell
Indus., Inc., 315 F.3d 120, 124 (2d Cir. 2002).
81. Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 522 (9th Cir. 1981).
82. See Kern Cnty. Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
83. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 424 (1972).
84. Gwozdzinsky v. Zell/Chilmark Fund, L.P., 156 F.3d 305, 310 (2d Cir. 1998).
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In its seminal Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp. decision,85 the Supreme Court amplified the introductory clause’s
role as a dispositive factor and, therefore, shrank Section 16(b)’s sphere
of influence.86 Ultimately, though, the scope of Kern County’s impact
remained wholly undefined until the lower courts later weighed in on
the severability of the Supreme Court’s holding from Kern County’s
specific fact pattern.87 Since courts were initially divided about whether
to extrapolate Kern County’s holding to other cases or whether to limit
Kern County to a unique set of facts,88 it is important to first become
familiar with the facts of the case.
Occidental Petroleum Corp. (“Occidental”) purchased over 10% of
Kern County Land Co. (“Old Kern”) common stock and extended a
tender offer to purchase more.89 But Old Kern opted instead to engage
in a defensive merger with Tenneco, Inc. (“Tenneco”), under which
Tenneco agreed to acquire the company through a newly created
corporation called Kern County Land Co. (“New Kern”).90 Pursuant to
the merger agreement, Old Kern shareholders were expected to forfeit
their shares of Old Kern common stock in exchange for the equivalent
number of Tenneco preferred shares.91
Occidental, with its takeover attempt thwarted and its stake in Old
Kern marginalized, took action to protect its interests.92 Pending final
approval of the Old Kern-Tenneco merger, Occidental reached an
agreement with Tenneco granting Tenneco’s subsidiary, Tenneco Corp.,
the option to buy all of Occidental’s Old Kern-substituted, Tenneco
preferred stock at $105 a share.93 Although Tenneco Corp. was only
authorized to exercise the option more than six months after
Occidental’s tender offer expired, Occidental and Tenneco executed the
option agreement within six months of Occidental’s purchase of a more

85. 411 U.S. 582 (1973). Kern County was “the culmination of [a] line of cases,
the key decision concerning unorthodox transactions, and the only Supreme Court case
treating the issue in any depth.” Jacobs, supra note 16, at 428.
86. See infra notes 96–101 and accompanying text.
87. See infra Part II.
88. See infra Part II.
89. Kern Cnty., 411 U.S. at 585.
90. Id. at 586.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 587.
93. Id.
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than 10% stake in Old Kern.94 Reasoning that Occidental’s execution of
the option, as well as its Old Kern-for-Tenneco share exchange, were
sales that occurred within six months of the purchase that transformed
Occidental into an over-10% beneficial owner of Old Kern stock, New
Kern sued for the Section 16(b) disgorgement of Occidental’s realized
profits.95
The Supreme Court noted that, while Section 16(b) clearly applied
to prototypical cash-for-stock purchases and sales, it was less clear
whether the statute similarly included borderline, “unorthodox
transactions.”96 Reflecting on prior lower court decisions, the Kern
County Supreme Court observed that the Section 16(b) fate of a
borderline transaction depends upon a court’s inquiry into “whether the
transaction may serve as a vehicle for the evil which Congress sought to
prevent—the realization of short-swing profits based upon access to
inside information . . . .”97 The congressional purpose, as articulated in
Section 16(b)’s introductory clause, controls whether a transaction
qualifies as a matching purchase or sale under the statute.98
In offering its unorthodox transaction analysis, the Supreme Court
adopted the pragmatic approach, which required it to engage in a casespecific analysis to determine “both from the economics of the
transaction and the modus operandi of the insider whether there
exist[ed] the possibility of speculative abuse of inside information.”99 In
doing so, it rejected the objective approach, previously adopted by some
lower courts, which subjected all sale and purchase, or purchase and
sale, combinations to Section 16(b), whether or not they offered any
potential for speculative abuse.100 Thus the Supreme Court found that
where Section 16(b)’s introductory purpose clause could not justify
disgorgement in a specific factual scenario, the typical objective and flat

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 587–88.
Id. at 590.
Id. at 593–94.
Id. at 594–95.
Id. at 595. See also Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 424
n.4 (1972).
99. Kern Cnty., 411 U.S. at 612 (Douglas, J., dissenting). This characterization
was concocted by the dissent as a pejorative assessment, but rather nicely sums up the
approach, all the same.
100. Id. at 606.
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application of Section 16(b) would indeed give way to a more subjective
and malleable rule.101
Under the unusual circumstances of Kern County, Occidental’s
tender offer and hostile takeover attempt guaranteed that the target
company, Old Kern, would not share any inside information with
Occidental.102 The Court reasoned, therefore, that Occidental’s over10% ownership anomalously did not lend itself to the type of
speculative abuse that could yield guaranteed, short-swing profits.103
The substitution of Tenneco stock for Occidental’s Old Kern stock
did not qualify as a purchase or sale subject to 16(b) because of the
convergence of two factors: the exchange occurred involuntarily and
under circumstances which precluded any possibility of inside
information being exploited for speculative gain.104
Moreover,
execution of the option agreement did not qualify as a Section 16(b) sale
since it did not present Occidental with a sufficient opportunity to turn a
speculative profit off of inside information about Old Kern.105 First,
Occidental and Tenneco’s divergent interests in making the deal made it
unlikely that Occidental would actually be privy to inside information.106
Second, the option agreement’s grant of exclusive control to Tenneco to
decide whether or not to exercise the option after six months precluded
Occidental from actually engaging in any speculative abuse.107

101. The Kern County majority held that the statutory purpose would be best
honored by a case-by-case analysis. See id. at 594–95 (majority opinion). The dissent,
which championed the objective approach, responded by arguing that, in fact “the
recognized purpose and aim of the statute are more consistently and protectively to be
served if the statute is construed literally and objectively rather than non-literally and
subjectively on a case-by-case application.” Id. at 608 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting
Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 538 (9th Cir. 1966) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
102. Id. at 598 (majority opinion).
103. Id. at 596.
104. Id. at 600.
105. Id. at 601.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 602–03. The Court offered a number of other reasons as well to explain
why the option agreement was not an instrument of speculation. Id. at 603. Since those
reasons are not applicable to the present discussion or have since been superseded, they
will not be addressed in this Note. See infra notes 200–205 and accompanying text
regarding the current law on the execution and exercise of an option agreement.
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F. BACKGROUND TO CIRCUIT SPLIT
While it is clear that the existence of the “the possibility of
speculative abuse of inside information” is the death knell for the
Section 16(b) Kern County exemption,108 the exact scope of the
exemption is unclear and has been a source of confusion among the
lower courts. The district court, in Portnoy v. Seligman & Latz, Inc.,109
shed some light on the confusion left in the wake of Kern County by at
least identifying the root of the problem. It observed that although Kern
County identified three different factors—accessibility to inside
information, voluntariness, and the possibility of speculative abuse—to
consider in a Section 16(b) analysis, it never explained what
combination of factors would be necessary for an insider to qualify for a
Section 16(b) Kern County exemption.110
II. POST-KERN COUNTY CONFUSION: DIVERGENT NOTIONS OF
FIDELITY TO THE STATUTORY PURPOSE
In the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s Kern County decision, the
courts’ strict mechanical application of Section 16(b) to qualifying
orthodox transactions continued unabated.111 As always, the voluntary
or involuntary nature of the transaction and the insider’s level of access
to inside information were of no relevance to courts’ Section 16(b)
purchase and sale calculations;112 however, as with regards to
unorthodox transactions, a circuit split emerged, with each circuit
staking out its respective positions on how courts should interpret and

108.
109.
110.

Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232, 237 (1976).
516 F. Supp. 1188, 1194 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
See Portnoy v. Seligman & Latz, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1188, 1194 (S.D.N.Y.

1981).
111. See Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 522 (9th Cir. 1981) (“[T]he
pragmatic approach has not ousted the objective view. Rather, the pragmatic approach
is used to determine the boundaries of the statute’s definitional scope in borderline
situations, especially unorthodox transactions. For garden-variety transactions which
cannot be regarded as unorthodox, the pragmatic approach is not applicable.”).
112. This was in full accordance with Kern County’s own statement that “traditional
cash-for-stock transactions that result in a purchase and sale or a sale and purchase
within the six-month, statutory period are clearly within the purview of [Section] 16(b) .
. . .” Kern Cnty., 411 U.S. at 593.
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apply the Kern County holding.113 An overwhelming number of courts
have imposed a double requirement, under which both (a)
involuntariness and (b) a lack of access to inside information (or an
absence of potential for speculative abuse) are necessary conditions to
trigger the Kern County exemption for a particular transaction.114 All
the same, the circuit courts, based in part on their adoption of either a
pragmatic or objective approach, differ on the role that each respective
factor plays in the operation and ultimate scope of the Kern County
exemption.
This Part begins by highlighting the Ninth and Fifth Circuits’ basic,
objective approach to interpreting Kern County. Then, it presents the
Second Circuit’s application of a subjective, pragmatic approach to Kern
County. Finally, it closes with coverage of the SEC’s adoption of the
Second Circuit approach and its applications therein.
A. NINTH AND FIFTH CIRCUITS: NARROW KERN COUNTY READING
OVERLAYING AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH
Part II.A highlights the Ninth and Fifth Circuits’ objective approach
to Section 16(b) application. According to the objective approach, an
unorthodox transaction that meets the mechanical criteria of Section
16(b) is automatically subject to Section 16(b)’s trading restrictions and
may only earn a reprieve from disgorgement if it falls under an
exceedingly narrow construction of the Kern County exception.115 In
fact, according to the Ninth and Fifth Circuits, the Kern County
exception will only apply when the double requirement is met and both
involuntariness and lack of access to inside information are
established.116 To test for the double requirement, the Ninth and Fifth

113.
114.

See infra Part II.A–B.
Jacobs, supra note 16, at 433. The factors, access to inside information and
possibility of speculative abuse, are really one and the same for the purposes of this
analysis.
115. See Colan v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 951 F.2d 1512, 1523 (9th Cir. 1991); Texas
Int’l Airlines v. Nat’l Airlines, Inc., 714 F.2d 533, 539 (5th Cir. 1983).
116. Colan, 951 F.2d at 1522 (“Courts following Kern County have recognized that
involuntariness is an important factor in determining whether or not a transaction
constitutes a ‘sale’ or ‘purchase’ within section 16(b).”). The Ninth Circuit decision
references a Fifth Circuit decision, Texas Int’l Airlines v. Nat’l Airlines, Inc., 714 F.2d
533, 540 (5th Cir. 1983), and an Eleventh Circuit decision, Gund v. First Florida
Banks, Inc., 726 F.2d 682, 686 (11th Cir. 1984), as post-Kern County affirmations that
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Circuit courts adopt a two-step inquiry, assessing, first, whether the
offsetting transaction at issue is “unorthodox”, and, second, whether the
transaction affords a defendant the possibility of engaging in speculative
abuse of inside information.117 Under this scheme, involuntariness is a
determining factor in the first step.118 This subsection will proceed by
first examining one example of the Ninth Circuit’s application of the
Kern County unorthodox transaction analysis and, second, by offering a
parallel analysis of one Fifth Circuit court’s application of Kern County.
1. Ninth Circuit Approach: Colan v. Mesa Petroleum Co.
In the Ninth Circuit’s Colan v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,119 Mesa had
purchased a 10% stake in Unocal that it planned to increase by making a
tender offer.120 But, after Unocal rebuffed Mesa’s takeover bid, Mesa
reversed course and agreed to exchange its Unocal stock for debt
securities.121 Significantly, Mesa’s exchange was not involuntary.122
Mesa negotiated for the resolution and, at most, may have been
“coerced” by financial exigency.123 Accordingly, the Colan court
characterized the transactions as voluntary, orthodox transactions,
subject to Section 16(b).124 The court’s analysis ended after the first step
of inquiry since the lack of involuntariness rendered the exchange an
orthodox transaction squarely governed by Section 16(b).125 The court
did not, therefore, investigate whether defendants had an opportunity to
engage in the speculative abuse of inside information.126 In its decision,
the court did not assign any significance to the listing of unorthodox
transaction types in footnote twenty-four of the Kern County opinion, all

involuntariness is the second necessary factor of the Section 16(b) unorthodox
transaction exemption. Id.
117. See, e.g., Colan, 951 F.2d at 1523–25; Texas Int’l Airlines, 714 F.2d at 539–40.
118. See Colan, 951 F.2d at 1523–25; Texas Int’l Airlines, 714 F.2d at 540.
119. 951 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1991).
120. Colan, 951 F.2d at 1514.
121. Id. at 1515.
122. Id. at 1522.
123. Id.
124. Id. (citing Oliff v. Exchange Int’l Corp., 669 F.2d 1162 (7th Cir. 1980); Tyco
Laboratories, Inc. v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
125. Id. at 1525.
126. Id.
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but dismissing the footnote as unnecessary to the opinion.127 Instead, the
Ninth Circuit’s two-step analysis, as applied to the case’s unique set of
facts, alone determined the orthodoxy of a particular transaction128
The Ninth Circuit analysis throttled any impact Kern County might
have on other, factually dissimilar cases in the circuit.129 Reading Kern
County as narrowly as could be, the Ninth Circuit volunteered only that
Kern County’s Section 16(b) exception could be applied to a factually
identical case.130 Nothing less than a factual scenario involving a
merger-induced, involuntary exchange of the target company’s stock for
another company’s stock could qualify for the Kern County
exemption.131 The Colan court observed that, not coincidentally, most
of the unorthodox transactions that qualified for Kern County’s narrow
exception were stock exchanges effectuated in the context of a
merger.132
2. Fifth Circuit Approach: Texas International Airlines v. National
Airlines, Inc.
In Texas International Airlines v. National Airlines, Inc.,133 the Fifth
Circuit, much like the Ninth Circuit, envisioned the voluntariness factor
as an element in the first step determination of a transaction’s Section
16(b) orthodoxy, and, more generally, shared the Ninth Circuit’s vision
of how the two Kern County factors would interact with one another to
establish a Section 16(b) exception for a particular transaction. 134 In this
case, Texas International Airlines (“TI”) became a beneficial owner of
National Airlines, Inc. (“National”) after its holdings crossed the 10%
threshold.135 Then, within six months of that purchase, TI reached an
agreement with Pan American World Airways, Inc. (“Pan Am”) to sell
Pan Am a certain number of National shares at a fixed price.136 Soon
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id. at 1523–25.
Id. at 1523.
Id. at 1523.
Id.
Id. (citing, e.g., Heublein, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 722 F.2d 29, 31 (2d
Cir. 1983); Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340, 344 (4th Cir. 1973)).
133. Texas Int’l Airlines v. Nat’l Airlines, Inc., 714 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1983).
134. Id. at 540.
135. Id. at 535.
136. Id.
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thereafter, National and Pan Am entered into a merger agreement, which
incorporated the terms of a stock-for-cash exchange of National stock.137
The Fifth Circuit ultimately held TI liable since there was nothing
involuntary about the transaction that could render it unorthodox.138
Texas International Airlines requires Fifth Circuit courts to honor
and abide by the mechanical approach to Section 16(b), unless a case
presents a fact pattern that mimics Kern County, in which case, the
pragmatic approach would indeed apply.139 So, before ever conducting
the pragmatic, subjective test to assess the possibility of speculative
abuse, a court would first need to overcome the initial hurdle of
branding a Kern County-like transaction as unorthodox.140 According to
the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court’s distinction between orthodox
transactions, such as garden variety cash-for-stock transactions, and
unorthodox transactions, such as stock-for stock exchanges, does not
correlate to any greater or lesser chance of speculative abuse.141 Instead,
the Fifth Circuit opines that, in the view of the Supreme Court, the
involuntariness factor determines the orthodoxy of a transaction.142
B. SECOND CIRCUIT: NARROW KERN COUNTY READING OVERLAYING A
PRAGMATIC APPROACH
Part II.B begins with a presentation of the Second Circuit’s
subjective, pragmatic approach to Section 16(b)’s operation and a
demonstration of how it continues to be relevant even post-Kern County.
Next, Part II.B presents two Second Circuit cases showing that the
Second Circuit’s unorthodox transaction analysis is predicated on a twofactor test that screens for both involuntariness and inaccessibility of
inside information. Part II.B concludes with the view of a rogue
Southern District of New York case that, while adopting the pragmatic
137. Id. This was a case where “a defeated tender offeror sold its shares in the
target corporation to a company with which the target had entered into a merger
agreement.” Colan, 951 F.2d at 1524.
138. Texas Int’l Airlines, 714 F.2d at 540 (“Despite the alleged lack of access to
inside information and therefore the possibility of speculative abuse, the volitional
character of the exchange is sufficient reason to trigger applicability of the language of
section 16(b).”).
139. Id. at 539.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 539–40.
142. Id. at 540.
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approach, dismisses the involuntariness factor and implements a single
factor test for its Kern County analysis.
The Second Circuit’s subjective, pragmatic approach, which predates the Supreme Court’s Kern County decision,143 seems to have been
integrated even post-Kern County. As per the Second Circuit’s preKern County design, Section 16(b)’s purpose clause operates as
something of a gate-keeping provision.144 The potential for speculative
abuse is a “threshold issue” that must be assessed even before an
unorthodox transaction’s elements are matched to Section 16(b)’s
mechanically applied criteria.145 Even now, a Second Circuit court will
always conduct an initial screening of an unorthodox transaction to
assess its potential for speculative abuse.146 If an unorthodox transaction
carries “‘at least the possibility of’ speculative abuse of inside
information,” a Second Circuit court will immediately apply Section
16(b) and test for the presence of Section 16(b)’s mechanically applied
criteria.147 While Second Circuit cases do not explicate the relationship
between its own threshold test and the Kern County exemption
analysis,148 it is clear that once the threshold test yields a positive finding
for a possibility of speculative abuse, the Kern County unorthodox
transaction exception would no longer serve as a viable defense for the
insider.149
1. Second Circuit’s Two-Factor Kern County Analysis
In conducting an unorthodox transaction analysis, the Second
Circuit, almost uniformly, has adopted a narrow reading of Kern County
143. See Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 519–20 (2d Cir. 1966) (reversing Second
Circuit’s earlier application of an objective rule).
144. See Portnoy v. Seligman & Latz, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1188, 1195 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (“[T]o judge whether section 16(b) means what it says, a court must first ask
whether the statute, in light of its purpose, should mean what it says.”) (emphasis
added).
145. See, e.g., Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425 F.2d 348, 351, 353 (2d Cir. 1970).
146. Portnoy, 516 F. Supp. at 1195.
147. See, e.g., Huppe v. WPCS Int’l Inc., 670 F.3d 214, 218–19 (2d Cir. 2012);
Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 46 (2d Cir. 2012); Blau,
363 F.2d at 519.
148. See, e.g., Huppe, 670 F.3d at 218–19; Steel Partners II, L.P. v. Bell Indus., Inc.,
315 F.3d 120, 129 (2d Cir. 2002); Gwozdzinsky v. Zell/Chilmark Fund, L.P., 156 F.3d
305, 310 (2d Cir. 1998).
149. See cases cited supra note 147.
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that mandates the presence of both Kern County factors to warrant a
possible exemption from 16(b) disgorgement. In particular, the Second
Circuit has insisted on fulfillment of Kern County’s “two factors: (1) the
unlikelihood of actual access to inside information in an atmosphere of
hostility by a party adverse in interest; and (2) the utter inability of the
unsuccessful party to control the course of events.”150 In fact, in
American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co.,151 a Second Circuit decision
rendered just a few years after Kern County, the court immediately
subscribed to the dual requirement view.152
In American Standard, Crane Co. (“Crane”) acquired a more than
10% stake in Westinghouse Air Brake Co. (“Air Brake”) stock, with the
intention of ultimately effecting a merger between the two companies.153
Air Brake, however, rejected Crane’s overtures and negotiated a
defensive merger with American Standard Inc. (“Standard”).154 Under
the deal, Air Brake shareholders, such as Crane, would receive a certain
amount of Standard shares in exchange for their outstanding Brake
shares.155 As the merger agreement dictated, Crane exchanged its Brake
shares for Standard shares; a few days later, Crane sold off its newly
acquired Standard shares for a substantial profit.156 Standard filed suit,
alleging that Crane violated Section 16(b) by purchasing and selling the
issuer’s stocks within a six month period, thereby exploiting the inside
information it was privy to in order to earn short swing profits.157 The
Second Circuit, however, rejected Standard’s claims, in part, by
comparing Crane, the defeated tender offeror in American Standard, to
Occidental, the defeated tender offeror in Kern County.158 Even though
Crane was a 10% stockholder, typically presumed to be an insider, no
such presumption could be afforded in this defensive merger context
150.
151.
152.

American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co., 510 F.2d 1043, 1054 (2d Cir. 1975).
510 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1975).
Id. at 1053. Ironically, American Standard described the defensive merger
context in Kern County to be “sui generis,” intimating, much like the Ninth and Fifth
Circuits later held, that the Kern County exception might be exceedingly limited. Id.
Subsequent Second Circuit decisions did not take such a restrictive approach, however.
153. Id. at 1047.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1048.
156. Id. at 1049.
157. Id. at 1051. The Court presented three alternative theories as to which two
transactions qualified for the matching purchase and sale. See id.
158. Id. at 1053–55.
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where the underlying hostilities between Standard and Crane all but
guaranteed there would be no exchange of confidential information.159
Moreover, Crane’s failure to prevent the unwanted merger from taking
place was itself proof that Crane did not exert much control over the
target company’s directors or stockholders.160
Subsequent Second Circuit decisions have adhered to American
Standard’s dual requirement view, confirming that the Kern County
exemption only applies to (1) an involuntary transaction (2) conducted
by a beneficial owner who lacks access to inside information.161
Moreover, since American Standard, the Second Circuit has continued
to subscribe to its particular view of how the two Kern County factors
interact. The Second Circuit’s decision in At Home Corp. v. Cox
Communications, Inc.162 brings the Second Circuit’s application of the
Kern County dual requirement into clear view. In At Home, Comcast, a
10% beneficial owner of At Home Corp., reached an agreement with
AT&T to buy puts, or the right to sell shares, in At Home Corp.163
Around the same time, Comcast purchased three cable companies,
which already owned warrants in At Home Corp.164 Finally, Comcast
proceeded to exercise the puts it had purchased from AT&T.165
In assessing potential 16(b) liability in At Home, the district court
framed the issue as a matter of whether a matching purchase occurs
when an insider (Comcast) acquires a third-party company that holds
stock in the corporate issuer (At Home Corp.) and, in effect, indirectly
purchases the issuer’s stock.166 The district court applied the Kern
County unorthodox transaction analysis and found that the transaction
did not qualify as a Section 16(b) purchase since it did not elicit any
concerns of speculative abuse.167 The Second Circuit, however,

159.
160.
161.

Id. at 1062 (“The enemy of yesterday is not the friendly insider of tomorrow.”).
Id. at 1055.
Huppe v. WPCS Int’l Inc., 670 F.3d 214, 218–19 (2d Cir. 2012); Analytical
Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 45 (2d Cir. 2012); At Home Corp. v.
Cox Commc’ns, Inc., 446 F.3d 403, 408 (2d Cir. 2006).
162. 446 F.3d 403 (2d Cir. 2006).
163. At Home Corp. v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 2d 404, 405 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 410.
167. Id. at 411.
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resoundingly rejected the district court’s analysis, since the two
prerequisites for Kern County analysis were not met.168
According to the Second Circuit, Kern County’s unorthodox
transaction analysis does not apply to an insider transaction simply
because it may take effect via a newly conceived financial instrument.169
Rather, the Kern County analysis will only yield an effective defense for
the insider if both the insider and the transaction are found to be
“atypical.”170 In Kern County, the insider was atypical since it passed
the two-factor test; it did not have access to insider knowledge and it
sold its shares involuntarily.171 In At Home, however, where the two
Kern County criteria were not both met, the insider was typical; no
matter how novel or atypical the transaction may have been, the court
could not apply the unorthodox transaction analysis.172
If the Kern County exception analysis fails, as it often does in the
Second Circuit, the Second Circuit still offers a simple, direct route
towards Section 16(b) exemption that bypasses the more treacherous
route paved by Kern County.173 As per its methodology of interpreting
Section 16(b) in line with the statutory purpose,174 the Second Circuit
will construe Section 16(b) narrowly when necessary to prevent its harsh
application.175 In fact, in At Home, where it was unlikely that a
company takeover would have been initiated just to reap short-term,
speculative profits, the Second Circuit ultimately exempted the
transaction from Section 16(b) liability by offering a statutory
justification. 176 The court inferred from the singular form of the
168.
169.
170.
171.

At Home Corp. v. Cox Commc’ns, 446 F.3d 403, 408 (2d Cir. 2006).
Id.
Id.
Id. This characterization is somewhat difficult to reconcile with the more
logical and straightforward formulation that would treat the insider as atypical given its
lack of access and the transaction as atypical in light of its involuntary nature.
172. Id. In two recent cases, the Second Circuit similarly refused to apply the
unorthodox transaction exception where both Kern County criteria were not met. See
Huppe v. WPCS Int’l Inc., 670 F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2012); Analytical Surveys, Inc. v.
Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2012).
173. See, e.g., At Home Corp., 446 F.3d at 408–10.
174. Portnoy v. Seligman & Latz, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1188, 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(quoting Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 262 (2d Cir. 1969)).
175. See, e.g., At Home Corp., 446 F.3d at 408–10.
176. Id. at 409. Given the disproportionate resources necessary to effect an
acquisition of a company and the entirely separate set of risks and opportunities

716

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVIII

statutory terms, “equity security” and “such issuer,” that 16(b) liability
could only attach where each transaction in a matching pair involved the
equity securities of the same company.177
2. Minority Southern District Court View Rejecting the Involuntariness
Factor
Part II.B.2 presents a minority court view that rejects Kern
County’s involuntariness factor as a necessary criterion for Section
16(b) disgorgement. While this view is largely discredited in the
Second Circuit, it highlights the ambiguity in Kern County’s
presentation of the governing factors for its unorthodox transaction
analysis. This subsection proceeds by analyzing the representative case
on point.
A minority view among the lower courts recognizes the dual
elements invoked in Kern County, but refuses to characterize them both
as necessary criteria for Section 16(b) disgorgement.178 In one Southern
District of New York case, Portnoy v. Seligman & Latz, Inc.,179 for
example, the court adopted a single factor standard, whereby the
plaintiff would only need to “show more than . . . a speculative potential
for speculative abuse of inside information.”180 In doing so, the court
brushed aside involuntariness and all but branded it an irrelevant factor
in establishing a Kern County exemption.181 In fact, it refused to
recognize Occidental’s sale of Tenneco shares in Kern County as having
been truly involuntary in the first place since Occidental, to the very
end, “was given a choice, not an ultimatum, to withdraw its investment,
plus a handsome profit, after losing the merger battle.”182
presented therein, the Second Circuit compared the likelihood of an insider purchasing
a company to reap speculative profits to an investor “speculating in tractors by buying a
farm.” Id. at 409. Nevertheless, the court conceded that a case-specific analysis was
necessary to reach its decision in this case since it was still possible that, under different
conditions, where the target company was a shell company that only held the issuer’s
securities, an insider could have incentive to purchase the company solely to purchase
its security holdings. Id. at 409–10.
177. Id. at 408–09.
178. See, e.g., Portnoy, 516 F. Supp. at 1198; Freedman v. Barrow, 427 F. Supp.
1129, 1148 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
179. 516 F. Supp. 1188.
180. Id. at 1200.
181. Id. at 1198.
182. Id.
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In Portnoy, defendant corporate insiders at Seligman & Latz sold
their personally-owned warrants in the company stock to a number of
underwriters.183 The underwriters subsequently exercised the warrants
so that they could include the underlying stock in the public offering of
Seligman & Latz stock.184 The insiders, meanwhile, earned a tidy profit
from their sale of the warrants to the underwriters.185 Plaintiffs, filing
suit under Section 16(b), demanded disgorgement of those profits on the
theory that the underwriters essentially acted as the insiders’ agents,
remotely allowing the insiders to purchase company stock through the
underwriters’ exercise of the stock and, within six months, to sell the
stocks at a profit through the public offering.186
Portnoy, however, dismissed any claims of an agency
relationship.187 Moreover, it held that the exercise of the warrants did
not constitute a statutory Section 16(b) purchase that could be paired
with the defendants’ initial sale of the warrants.188 Since the contract
between the insiders and the underwriters fixed the warrants’ exercise
price from the outset, the warrants’ exercise was nearly immune from
speculative abuse.189 Even though the insiders’ sale of the warrants was
wholly voluntary, it did not matter; the lack of potential for speculative
abuse alone dictated that Section 16(b) would not apply.190
C. SEC POSTSCRIPT: ADOPTION OF SECOND CIRCUIT’S PRAGMATIC
APPROACH & RESULTING INCLUSION OF DERIVATIVE SECURITIES AS 16(b)
PURCHASES & SALES
Since Section 16(b)’s inception, it was always clear that an
insider’s matching purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of the
corporate issuer’s equity securities was subject to Section 16(b)
regulation, but courts were split on whether Section 16(b) also applied to
more complex financial instruments involving derivative securities. The
Second Circuit, for one, generally maintained that transactions in
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 1189.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1189–90.
Id. at 1196.
Id. at 1195–96.
Id. at 1195.
Id. at 1198.
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derivative securities could qualify as Section 16(b) purchases and
sales.191 The Second Circuit, therefore, applied Section 16(b) to
transactions in derivative securities no differently than to equity
securities, as long as there was at least the possibility of speculative
abuse of inside information.192 Other courts, however, were less willing
to expand the Section 16(b) zone of bona fide purchases and sales to
include transactions in derivative securities.193 This uneven application
of Section 16(b) to derivative securities, whose use had become
increasingly popular, posed a challenge to the effective administration of
Section 16(b).194
The purpose of Section 16(b) remained front and center and, in
fact, seems to have been the driving force behind the SEC’s amendment
to include the purchase and sale of derivative securities as Section 16(b)
matching transactions.195 Specifically, in its 1991 amendments, the SEC
sought to stop investors from transacting in derivatives, rather than in
the underlying equity securities, as a means of circumventing liability
under Section 16(b).196 The SEC could effectively step in to close the
loophole since it was afforded special statutory authority under Section
16(b), which explicitly carved out an exception for “any transaction . . .
which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not

191. See Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 43 (2d Cir.
2012) (quoting Huppe v. WPCS Int’l Inc., 670 F.3d 214, 218 (2d Cir. 2012)); Blau v.
Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 516 (2d Cir. 1966). The Second Circuit’s position was
crystallized by its 1966 decision in Blau, 363 F.2d 507, and stands in contrast with
some of its earlier decisions. See, e.g., Silverman v. Landa, 306 F.2d 422 (2d Cir.
1962); Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1954).
192. See Huppe, 670 F.3d at 218–19; Analytical Surveys, Inc., 684 F.3d at 43, 46;
Blau, 363 F.2d at 516.
193. See Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal
Security Holders, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 28,869, 56 Fed. Reg. 7242,
7249 n.107 (Feb. 21, 1991) (citing Colan v. Monumental Corp., 713 F.2d 330 (7th Cir.
1983); Morales v. Mapco, 541 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1976); Silverman, 306 F.2d 422;
Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426).
194. See Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal
Security Holders, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 28,869, 56 Fed. Reg. at 7248.
195. Id. (“Given the uncertainty surrounding the application of Section 16 to
derivative securities under the former rules and existing case law, the Commission is
adopting a comprehensive regulatory framework, in order to effect the purposes of
section 16 and to address the proliferation of derivative securities and the popularity of
exchange-traded options.”).
196. Magma Power Co. v. Dow Chem. Co., 136 F.3d 316, 323 (2d Cir. 1998).

2013]

SECTION 16(b) EXISTENTIALISM

719

comprehended within the purpose of this subsection.”197 Since rules
promulgated by the SEC are entitled to deference,198 courts have
generally treated them as good law.199
As per the 1991 amendments issued by the SEC, Section 16(b) now
applies to the sale and purchase of derivative securities,200 including
“any option, warrant, convertible security, stock appreciation right, or
similar right with an exercise or conversion privilege related to an equity
security . . . .”201 In the words of Rule 16b-6(a), “[t]he establishment of
or increase in a call equivalent position . . . or put equivalent position” is
equivalent to a Section 16(b) purchase or sale of the underlying
security.202 Given that framework, a derivative security transaction
could be paired with either an offsetting derivative security transaction
197. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006).
Technically speaking, the SEC exceeded the bounds of its statutory right to exempt
transactions by drafting regulations meant to include the class of derivative securities
under Section 16(b). While the Third Circuit stated that “[t]he Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 authorizes the SEC to enact regulations defining which transactions are
included in the ban on short-swing trading,” Morrison v. Madison Dearborn Capital
Partners III L.P., 463 F.3d 312, 314 (3d Cir. 2006), a narrow reading of the statute
would suggest otherwise.
198. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843–44 (1984).
199. See, e.g., At Home Corp. v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., 446 F.3d 403, 407 (2d Cir.
2006); Roth v. Perseus, L.L.C., 522 F.3d 242, 249 (2d Cir. 2008).
200. Derivative securities are “financial instruments that derive their value (hence
the name) from an underlying security or index.” Magma Power, 136 F.3d at 321.
Equity securities, on the other hand, are actual stocks, or similar securities. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(11) (2006).
201. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(c) (2012). Transactions conducted in some of these
financial instruments were previously termed “unorthodox transactions” by Professor
Louis Loss, and the Supreme Court seems to have vouched for Loss’s understanding in
its infamously ambiguous Kern County footnote. See infra note 214 and accompanying
text.
202. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-6(a) (2012).
An option . . . is a purchased right to buy or sell property at a fixed or floating price . .
. . A call option gives the option holder the right to buy shares of an underlying
security at a particular price; thus, a call equivalent position is a derivative security
position that increases in value as the value of the underlying equity increases . . . . A
put option is the right to sell a security at a specified price; thus, the value of a put
option increases as the price of the underlying security falls. A put equivalent
position . . . increases in value as the value of the underlying equity security
decreases.
Magma Power, 136 F.3d at 321 n.2 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
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or a transaction in the underlying security in order to trigger
disgorgement.203 The amendments drastically changed the Section 16(b)
prospects of “unorthodox transactions” in derivative securities, which
were not uniformly treated as 16(b) purchases or sales up until that
point.204 The SEC’s inclusion of derivative security instruments under
Section 16(b) exposed all transactions in derivative securities to 16(b)
disgorgement.205 At the same time, the typical rules for excepting
unorthodox transactions became applicable to the many derivative
security instruments that were so classified.
III. CRITIQUE OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S PRAGMATIC KERN COUNTY
ANALYSIS
The most natural approach to Section 16(b), from a statutory
perspective, requires implementation of the Ninth and Fifth Circuit
objective approach. After all, Section 16(b)’s mechanical criteria set the
tone for the objective, strict liability-like approach by compelling
disgorgement of short-swing profits regardless of the insider’s intent and
irrespective of whether the insider actually misused inside information
for personal gain.206 The introductory purpose clause can be dismissed
as a mere statement of constitutional justification that should not dictate
the operation of 16(b).207 Therefore, the pragmatic approach, which
infuses 16(b)’s introductory purpose clause with greater operational
leeway than it grants its crude rule of thumb, must incorporate some
semblance of the objective approach into its scheme. The Second
Circuit’s uneasy marriage of the objective and subjective approaches
highlights the inherent weakness in its position and necessarily limits its
application.
Part III identifies and analyzes some curiosities and inconsistencies
in the Second Circuit approach that may best reflect or even seek to
203. See Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal
Security Holders, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 28,869, 56 Fed. Reg. 7242,
7251 (Feb. 21, 1991).
204. Id. at 7249 (“Unlike the results under prior Commission rules and case law,
under the rules adopted today, transactions in the derivative securities are matchable
against transactions in the underlying securities and against each other.”).
205. Id. (“[S]hort-swing profits obtained through use of derivative securities are
recoverable.”).
206. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006).
207. See supra notes 28–33 and accompanying text.
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compensate for the tension inherent in adopting a pragmatic test in the
face of the statute’s objective overtones. This Part begins by unpacking
the seemingly overlapping Second Circuit and Supreme Court standards
that the Second Circuit consistently invokes. Then, it proceeds to offer
an explanation for the redundancy in light of the objective-subjective
conundrum. In doing so, it highlights how the Second Circuit’s
pragmatic approach unsuccessfully incorporates some measure of
objectivity into its Kern County test so as to comply with Section
16(b)’s clear statutory mandate for an objective test. Second, this Part
critically examines the Second Circuit’s reading of Kern County’s
unorthodox transaction exemption as a two-factor test and suggests that
the formal, element-based criteria offer a concession of sorts to the
objective approach. It concludes that the Second Circuit fails to protect
the prophylactic quality of Section 16(b), as only a fully objective
approach can effectively do.
1. OVERLAPPING KERN COUNTY AND SECOND CIRCUIT TESTS
The Second Circuit approach is largely rooted in Blau v. Lamb,208 a
pre-Kern County decision in which the Second Circuit subjected a
transaction involving the conversion of securities to Section 16(b)
liability. There, the court unequivocally stated that stock conversions,
like all other acquisitions and dispositions of equity securities, would
qualify as purchases and sales under the broad definitions of the terms in
the Exchange Act.209 However, the court hedged, qualifying that a
particular transaction’s classification as a Section 16(b) sale or purchase
would hinge on application of a pragmatic test assessing whether the
transaction afforded the insider any opportunity to unfairly trade on
inside information.210 Technically, the court was saying that it would
not necessarily compel disgorgement from a transaction that met all the
mechanical criteria of 16(b).211 This statutory scheme was devised and
applied specifically to blunt the harshness of Section 16(b)’s otherwise
objective, strict liability-like mandate.212

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (1966).
Id. at 516.
Id. at 518.
Id. at 519.
Id.

722

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVIII

The Supreme Court’s Kern County ruling accredited the lower
courts’ category of borderline, or unorthodox transactions to be used in
reference to transactions that could not justifiably merit consideration as
a purchase or sale even under the broad, liberal meanings of the terms.213
In footnote twenty-four, the Supreme Court identified unorthodox
transactions as including derivative securities such as “stock
conversions, exchanges pursuant to mergers and other corporate
reorganizations, stock reclassifications, and dealings in options, rights
and warrants.”214 In ruling on their Section 16(b) eligibility, the
Supreme Court invoked the very standard adopted by Blau.215 In other
words, it held that unorthodox transactions qualify as bona-fide Section
16(b) purchases and sales if they give rise to the possibility of
speculative abuse.216 The Supreme Court then proceeded in ad hoc
fashion to determine whether the transaction at issue did, in fact, give
rise to speculative abuse, as required under Blau’s pragmatic test.217 In
so doing, it paid particular attention to the factors of involuntariness and
lack of access to inside information.218 All the same, this litmus test did
not express itself as a formal rule.219 The ad hoc confluence of the
factors ultimately gave rise to the confusion that enveloped the lower
circuit courts.220
But, even after the Supreme Court’s Kern County ruling, Second
Circuit decisions continued to muddle the waters by citing Blau’s
threshold test in the context of the Kern County test.221 Neither the
Supreme Court, nor any subsequent Second Circuit decisions map out
exactly how the two work in tandem.222 It is unclear, for example,
whether the Blau test is meant as a first-step inquiry, to be followed by
the Kern County test if no possibility of speculative abuse is found
213. Kern Cnty. Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 593–94
(1973).
214. Kern Cnty., 411 U.S. at 593 n.24 (citing LOSS, supra note 6, at 1069). See
Jacobs, supra note 16, at 403.
215. Kern Cnty., 411 U.S. at 595.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 595–604.
218. Id.
219. See supra notes 108–10 and accompanying text.
220. See supra Part II.
221. See, e.g., Huppe v. WPCS Int’l Inc., 670 F.3d 214, 218–19 (2d Cir. 2012);
Steel Partners II, L.P. v. Bell Indus., Inc., 315 F.3d 120, 129 (2d Cir. 2002);
Gwozdzinsky v. Zell/Chilmark Fund, L.P., 156 F.3d 305, 310 (2d Cir. 1998).
222. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 221.
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initially, or whether the two ultimately overlap. However, the simplest
understanding would seem to be that the Kern County two-factor test
provides the substance to Blau’s “possibility of speculative abuse” form.
Kern County’s contribution, according to the Second Circuit, would be
that it designed a two-factor test for involuntariness and inaccessibility
to inside information that would be determinative of whether a given
transaction lent itself to the possibility of speculative abuse.
The Second Circuit may have continued to cite to Blau, even after
Kern County, in order to display some modicum of fidelity to the
explicitly objective properties of Section 16(b). After all, Blau’s
speculative abuse test is formulated not as an independent assessment of
a transaction’s faculty for speculation, but as an initial inquiry to
determine whether or not a transaction is formally a “purchase” or a
“sale.”223 If Kern County’s two-factor test is, in fact, an explication of
the Second Circuit’s speculative abuse test, this would mean that an
insider’s voluntariness in conducting a transaction and potential to
access inside information would determine a transaction’s merits for
“purchase” or “sale” classification. By treating these factors as criteria
in the statutory definition of a “purchase” and “sale,” the Second
Circuit, at least, gives off an impression of fidelity to Section 16(b)’s
formalistic and objective statutory elements. As such, it injects an
element of certainty and predictability into an ad hoc analysis that
already strains the prophylactic quality of Section 16(b).224 Other
Second Circuit courts have similarly characterized the possibility of
speculative abuse test as a predicate to identifying a transaction as a
“purchase” or “sale,” presumably as a concession to 16(b)’s standard of
objectivity.225
However, the Second Circuit’s valiant effort to infuse its Blau
pragmatic approach with a dose of statutory objectivity does not pass
muster.
The Second Circuit’s bundling of involuntariness and
inaccessibility as necessary elements in the classification of a statutory
16(b) purchase or sale seems counterintuitive. It stands to reason
223.
224.

Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 518 (1966).
See Kern Cnty. Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 612
(1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority harms Section 16(b)’s
prophylactic quality by employing ad hoc analysis for transactions that meet 16(b)’s
mechanical criteria).
225. See, e.g., Steel Partners, 315 F.3d 120; Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec.
Co., 404 U.S. 418, 432 (1972).
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instead that involuntariness should dictate whether the insider actually
conducted a sale or purchase, while inaccessibility to inside information
should determine whether there was a possibility of speculative abuse.
In fact, this is exactly how the Ninth and Fifth Circuits understood the
dynamic between the two factors in Kern County’s unorthodox
transaction analysis.226 Moreover, Kern County’s explicit, side-by-side
pairing of involuntariness and lack of the possibility of speculative
abuse as prerequisites for initiating the unorthodox transaction
analysis227 proves the Second Circuit’s treatment of involuntariness as a
factor in establishing the absence of a possibility of speculative abuse228
cannot be accurate.
2. SECOND CIRCUIT READING OF KERN COUNTY AS A FORMAL, TWOFACTOR TEST
The Second Circuit’s insistence on both involuntariness and
inaccessibility to inside information as elements of a formal test for the
possibility of speculative abuse can be similarly understood as an ode to
the objectivity of Section 16(b)’s statutory language. It is true that a
close reading of Kern County may support the Second Circuit’s dual
requirement approach and that most lower courts have subscribed to that
view.229 Nevertheless, the need for both criteria is suspect, as scholar
Arnold S. Jacobs observes.230 Jacobs argues it is superfluous to require
fulfillment of both factors if the purpose is simply to prevent insider
trading; one or the other would suffice for that purpose.231
Strictly speaking, Jacobs may be right; but the double requirement
can be justified if seen as essentially a hybrid, subjective-objective test.
In fact, this may be ideal under the Second Circuit’s subjective
approach, which tailors the application of Section 16(b) to transactions
that violate the statutory purpose. By giving some definite form to its
Kern County analysis, the Second Circuit curtails some of the
unpredictability that its pragmatic approach engenders, and restores
226.
227.
228.

See supra notes 115–18 and accompanying text.
Kern Cnty., 411 U.S. at 600.
See id. (“[T]he involuntary nature of Occidental’s exchange, when coupled
with the absence of the possibility of speculative abuse of inside information, convinces
us that § 16(b) should not apply to transactions such as this one.”).
229. Jacobs, supra note 16, at 433–34.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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some level of deterrence to the application of Section 16(b), which was,
a priori, devised for its prophylactic quality. Moreover, practically
speaking, the imposition of Kern County’s two-factor test on Blau’s
pragmatic test severely shrinks the number of cases that would come out
differently under the objective and subjective approaches. Under this
scheme, an objective approach effectively applies anyway, unless an
insider, who has access to inside information, conducts a voluntary
transaction.
CONCLUSION
The drafters of Section 16(b) likely never intended for the
introductory purpose clause to play a decisive role in Section 16(b)’s
application.232
On the contrary, they envisioned an objective,
mechanical operation of Section 16(b) that could trigger disgorgement
of an insider’s ill-gained profits as long as the statutory elements of
Section 16(b) were present.233 Under that strict liability-like approach,
the law imposed liability even if the defendant insider never intended to
earn a speculative profit from his or her inside knowledge and even if
the defendant insider never actually possessed inside information that he
or she could exploit for personal gain.234
The flat rule further stipulated that insiders who managed to evade
Section 16(b)’s reach by spacing offsetting transactions six months and
one day apart were perfectly within their rights to do so.235 As the Court
in Kern County famously declared, Congress “sought to curb the evils of
insider trading [by] taking the profits out of a class of transactions in
which the possibility of abuse was believed to be intolerably great.”236
The prophylactic rule was only realistically expected to prevent
instances where the possibility of abuse was intolerably great, but had
no illusion of completely eliminating the evil of insider trading. As a
prophylactic rule, Section 16(b) was carefully crafted to simplify
implementation of the rule and keep the costs of administration down.237
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part I.B.
See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Securities Co., 423 U.S. 232, 243
(1976) (quoting Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 422 (1972).
237. See Okamoto, supra note 3, at 192.
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In fact, it may well be that Section 16(b) was never criminalized for the
same reason; the drafters never planned to expend considerable
resources in prosecuting violators of the law since the expectation was
that Section 16(b) would act primarily as an agent of deterrence.238
In light of Section 16(b)’s clearly objective criteria, it is
understandable why it would seem appropriate to marginalize the
introductory purpose clause’s role in Section 16(b)’s application.
Professor Thel, for one, concluded: “The clause may deserve respect,
but when it was inserted, no one suggested that it would control the
operative reach of the statute, and by and large it has not.”239 But, while
Professor Thel may have been right to observe that the statutory purpose
was never meant to control the statutory reach, it is no longer accurate to
say that it does not do just that. In fact, Section 16(b)’s introductory
purpose clause has assumed a determinative role in the adjudication of
Section 16(b) suits that was likely never imagined by its drafters.
This is particularly so in the Second Circuit, which has
wholeheartedly embraced the pragmatic approach to Section 16(b) and
elevated the purpose clause to the role of arbiter of the orthodoxy and
Section 16(b) liability for all transactions undertaken by an insider.240
To be sure, the statutory purpose is limited by a narrow reading of Kern
County that confines the unorthodox transaction exception to
circumstances in which both Kern County factors are present.241 Yet, as
the history of Section 16(b) has shown, the introductory purpose clause
has come to overshadow the flat rule and frustrate some of its goals.242
In fact, most courts have adopted the pragmatic approach, limiting
Section 16(b) disgorgement to those instances where the possibility of
speculative abuse exists.243 The SEC has similarly operated under the
presumption that the statutory goal is controlling.244 When the
proliferation of derivative securities exposed a gap in the law that
insiders could exploit by transacting in derivatives, the SEC exercised
its power to protect the goals of Section 16(b) and close the gap.
238.
239.

See Jacobs, supra note 16, at 348. But see Thel, supra note 28, at 449–50.
Thel, supra note 28, at 481. Thel acknowledges that the statutory purpose can
play a determinative role in courts’ 16(b) adjudication of “unorthodox transactions,” but
downplays it as “sometimes inform[ing] the construction of the statute.” Id. at n.334.
240. See supra Part II.B.
241. See supra Part II.B.
242. See supra Part II.
243. See supra Part II.A–B.
244. See supra Part II.C.
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While these adaptations may have been necessary to sustain
Section 16(b)’s viability in an age of increasingly complex financial
instruments, we should acknowledge at what cost this survival has
come. In courts today, Section 16(b) analyses increasingly crop up in
the context of unorthodox transactions,245 a sign that simple
administration of the law has become elusive and that the prophylactic
quality of Section 16(b) is flailing.246 The courts’ pragmatic approaches
require case-specific analyses that belie Section 16(b)’s simple
administration. It is that erosion of Section 16(b)’s clear, mechanical
operation that has diluted Section 16(b)’s value as a deterrent. Even the
purpose clause, which seemingly emerges as the victor, has lost some of
its prophylactic luster.

245.
246.

See Romeo & Dye, supra note 7, at 598.
Justice Douglas, in his Kern County dissent, argued that the majority’s ad hoc
unorthodox transaction analysis undermined Section 16(b)’s prophylactic nature. See
Kern Cnty. Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 612 (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). However, unlike the position advanced in this Note, Justice
Douglas limited his criticism to the ad hoc analysis of factual scenarios that clearly met
Section 16(b)’s mechanical criteria. Id. at 613.

